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1. Sir Christopher ~oames remarked that separate talks 
had been held on specialty steel and soya. 
2. Mr Hij~!!! reported on the previous day's discussions 
of the working group on trade issues. 
Points raised by the EC side: 
( i) Information on float glass submitted by the Italian 
government to the US Treasury had been useful, but insufficient to 
permit the Treasury to change its position on countervailing duty. 
(ii) In the m&.tter of ~ actions to challenge Treasury 
decisions on float glass and rolled steel, the Community preferred 
not to intervene directly, but stood ready to provide information 
or other help to the Treasury. 
(iii) The general discussion of the automobile antidumpi~ 
~ underlined its enormous political and economic importance. 
The technical discussion had focussed on the means of minimizing 
the scale of the problem. 
3. Points raised by the US side: 
(i) Compl~~~ts under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 
(a) ~i.r_i.i_~mport ..E.'~ on canned fruit and vegetables. It had 
been pointed out to the US side that a steady market, where 
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very low cost supplies from Asia and elsewhere were excluded, 
served the interests of US exporters. For the present, T(IP 
applied only to tomato concentrate. The Commission was ready 
to discuss levels of MIP, though the subject was somewhat 
theoretical in view of the small US trade interest in tomato 
concentrate. Nevertheless, the US was concerned that 1.JIP might 
be extended to other canned fruit and vegetables, and therefore 
intended to proceed against the principle of MIP under GAT'.I' 
Art. XXIII, 2. 
(b) The sugar added le"YX had been part of the Kennedy Round package 
accepted by the U.S. However, they were concerned at the 
implementation of the levy. The EC was ready to have discussions, 
but had asked the US side for a short note on the complaint before 
arranging meetings of experts. 
(c) The egg_ alb_llmen complaint was not well understood in the 
Community. The EC was willing to continue discussions in 
Brussels if the US so wis~ed. 
( d) The US regarded the flour complaint a.a the most serious of the Sect. 
301 cases, because of the powerful interests and the amount of trade 
involved, and because it aimed at export refunds, a basic feature of 
the CAP. The EC maintained that refunds on flour had not been used 
to win new markets at US expense, but to preserve traditional markets 
in LDCs. In certain cases, US exports under PL 480 had disturbed these 
markets. The US side replied that food aid under PL 480 was meant 
not to disrupt nonnal commercial markets. They would like to know more 
about the developments that had caused concern to the Community. 
It was agreed that a full discussion of all the various aspects of the 
flour issue should be held between the responsible officials of both 
sides. 
(e) On barley malt, the EC had acknowledged and corrected its error: 
there was now no refund, and exports had turned down. However, 
existing commitments could not legally be cancelled. The EC 
could do no more. 
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(ii) EEC/EFTA rules of origin were being discussed in Geneva, 
but there was some impatience on the US side. Review of the matter 
would continue on a case-by-case basis. It was noted that the EC had 
already made three packages of modifications, and a fourth was on its 
way. 
(iii) Anti-inflation export insurance schemes were disliked by the 
Commission. The Italian scheme was inoperative for lack of funds. 
The Commission had proposed to the Council that the remaining (French 
and British) schemes be phased out. 
4. Turning to the automobile antidumping case, Sir Christopher 
Soaines urged that the problem be reduced to the minimum possible scale. 
Significant contributions could be made by the Treasury's treatment of 
exchange rates, the valuation of pollution equipment not required in 
Europe, changes in pricing since the reference period, and by the 
treatment of cases on a model-by-model basis, instead of country by 
country. 
Continuing, Sir Christopher said that the American decision would 
be shot through with economic and political consequences. A preliminary 
determination of dumping could cause irreversible damage to a mapufacturer's 
distribution network even though the ITC might later find that there 
had been no injury to the US industry. The position was particularly 
delicate for Volkswagen, whose sales in the US had been dropping for the 
last three years, and whose plans for investment in North America could 
be ruined. US action could have grave political consequences because 
the car industry occupied a key position in Europe not least in the 
weaker economies of Italy and the U.K. Bitterness and resentment would 
be engendered if the US took drastic action when their own car industry 
was booming, when they had a colossal surplus on the balance of trade, 
and when the main beneficiaries would be Japanese exporters. Sir Christopher 
asked Mr Macdonald to make these concerns known to Secretary Simon. 
,. 
6. Mr Macdonald replied that under US law, if "price discrimination" 
were found, the risk of damage during the remainder of the investigation 
should be placed on the foreign exporter, and not on the domestic industry. 
He observed that Volkswagen had never offered price assurances for the 
future, even though it was conceivable that matters might be settled on 
that basis. He would report Sir Christopher's remarks to Secretary Simon. 
He gave his assurance that the political and economic arguments would be 
translated into legal considerations to the extent that there was a margin 
for interpretation, and that discretion would be exercised wherever 
possible in favour of exporters. 
7. OECD Trade Pledge 
~..r Hijzen said that a decision would be required in two weeks 
whether to prolong the trade pledge for another year. The Commission 
favoured prolongation, and would prefer not to risk changing the text. 
Mr Yeutter's immediate personal reaction was to agree. The U::s authorities 
would be discussing the matter in the next few days. 
8. ~,r Wellenstein reported the previous day's discussions of the 
working group on North-South relations, treating the Paris conference and 
UNCTAD IV, Nairobi, together. The Group of 19 had made a declaration of 
dissatisfaction, with particular reference to the lack of results from 
the Raw Materials Commission. Mr Wellenstein felt that participants were 
witholding their best cards on raw materials in order to be able to play 
them at Nairobi. After Nairobi, some 12 or 15 items for further 
consideration in the dialogue would have to be selected, in which some 
progress could be achieved in the second half-year, in order to offer some 
satisfaction to each of the interest groups involved. He would propose 
to the Canadian co-chairman that a whole day be devoted by the Group of 
8 to the selection of items for further work. 
9. The US side agreed with this analysis of the situation, 
adding that they had never expected much real progress 
in the first half-year of the Conference but more in the second half. 
With this perspective, the Group of 19's declaration of dissatisfaction 
could be viewed simply as a tactical reaction to the W.ianilla declaration 
of the Group of 77. Mr Hartman said that in general, he felt encouraged 
by the attitude of the Group of 19. 
10. The US side gave its preliminary thinking for Nairobi, 
focusing on: 
(a) mechanisms to promote investments in raw materials in developing 
countries, to supplement but not replace the World Bank scheme; and 
(b) a response to the "integrated programme for raw materials". The 
US, like the EC, was ready to join in common studies of all products, 
but they considered that action to be taken should be decided after such 
studies, not before. 
11. On commodity-linked export financing, the US was committed 
~ to the principle of compensatory financing, and supported the IMF 
scheme discussed at Kingston. When a trust fund had been created by the 
sale of IMF1 gold, one use of the fund would be compensatory financing, 
but for the moment no funds were available. 
12. Both sides agreed that there was scarcely any point in a 
world conference on indebtedness. Among the LDCs themselves, there 
was little enthusiasm for such a discussion, and some opposition. 
Both US and EC remained ready to consider requests for help on a case-
by-case basis. It might be necessary to make a statement to that effect 
at Nairobi, and to refer to the easing of loan procedures, but neither 
the US nor the EC side was yet able to suggest a suitable wording. 
Sir Christopher Soames remarked that the developed countries 
must not give the impression that they were dragging their feet on indebted-
ness. 
6.-
13. On technology transfer, the main question was whether the 
US and the EC would support a code of conduct. It was agreed that 
it would be unwise to oppose the LDCs on such a point, and so both the 
US and EC would be prepared to say"yeef' to a code provided the contents 
were acceptable,and provided it was not obligatory. 
Sir Christopher Soames suggested that the EC and the US 
ought to compare lists of commodities and ideas on indebtedness for 
further work in the second ha.lf-year of the Paris conference. Mr Greenwald 
agreed, and added that the US would be happy to see the Paris conference 
extended, since it was a useful, non-polemical forum. Mr. Wellenstein 
warned against any statement that the dialogue must go on, since this 
would be seen by developing countries as a delaying tactic. If 
concrete results energed in the second half year, it might be possible 
to prolong the conference for work on additional topics. 
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FtJ/US HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS 
29 April 1976 
10.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. Room Berlaymont 13A 
WORKING PARTY I : Bilateral Trade Issues 
Co-Chairmen: Mr Hijzen 
Ambassador Yeutter 
1. Issues to be raised bv EC side 
=-==---···===-•=••==IUl!il--••·--· 
~. 
US escape clause procedures 
• Steel cases 
US anti-dumping procedures 
• Automobile cases (and Customs clearance baoklog) 
US countervailing duties procedures 
• 
• 
Float glass (Italian case; Customs Court Appeal) 
Rolled steel ( Customs Court Appeal) 
Issues to be raised bv US side 
----------·----
- Non-fat dry milk ,us soya exports) 
Complaints _under Art. 301 of the Trade Act (minimum 
import prices on fru'its and vegetables; sugar-added 
levY; egg albumen; flour; · barley malt; etc.) 
EC/EFTA rt1les of origin 
EC anti-inflation export insurance scheme 
... I •.. 
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3.30 p.m. to 6.00 p.m. - Room Berlaymont 13A 
WORKING PARTY II : North/South Relations 
Co-Chairmen: Mr Wellenstein 
Mr Greenwald 
1. Progress in Paris Conference 
2. Preparation of Nairobi UNCTAD 
3. Improved EC/us coordination in UN 
Dinners hosted by .Ambassador Hinton and :Mr Morris 
30 April 1976 
10.00 a.m. to 12 noon - Room Berlaymont 13A 
PLENARY 
1. Bilateral Trade Issues 
2. 
1.00 p.m. 
Any Other Trade Bu.siness 
North/South Relations 
Luncheon hosted by Sir Christopher Soames 
(for all participan:ts at Berlaymont 13th floor) 
END OF CONSULTATIONS 
+ + + + + + + 
